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ABSTRACT
The Article discusses how the Supreme Court erred by summarily reversing the
Montana Supreme Court’s decision in Western Tradition Partnership v. AG and not
revisiting its holding in Citizens United v. FEC. The Article begins by discussing
the holding in the Western Tradition Partnership case and analyzing both the
majority and dissenting opinions. The Article then analyzes how the Montana
Supreme Court distinguished Citizens United, with the Court specifically looking at
the “unique” political history in Montana and finding that Montana’s ban on
corporate independent political spending served a compelling state interest and was
narrowly tailored to that interest.
The Article then transitions into an empirical study of the current campaign
finance landscape by specifically looking at states’ unique histories of corruption,
the lack of transparency with regard to corporate political expenditures, the public
perception of corruption in corporate political spending practices, the independence
of super Political Action Committees (PACS), the influence of political dark money,
and 501(c)(4) organizations and shell corporations being used to circumvent
campaign finance disclosure rules and Federal tax laws.
The Article concludes by listing additional arguments in favor of the Supreme
Court revisiting Citizens United including the breadth of the First Amendment, the
idea of corporations being “creatures of the state,” the ability of PACs to allow
corporate political participation, the issue of a state’s power to exclude foreign
corporations from participation in its democratic political institutions, shareholder
protection, the treatment of public unions, and the Supreme Court’s long-standing
history of altering constitutional doctrine when its understanding of the doctrine’s
factual underpinnings no longer appear to be accurate.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“A petition for certiorari will give the Court an opportunity to consider whether,
in light of the huge sums currently deployed to buy candidates' allegiance, Citizens
United should continue to hold sway.”1
The Article discusses how the Supreme Court erred by summarily reversing the
Montana Supreme Court’s decision in Western Tradition Partnership v. AG2 and not
revisiting its holding in Citizens United v. FEC.3 The Supreme Court’s decision in

1

Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 1307 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

2

W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 271 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2011).

3

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (FEC)4 removed the prohibition on
corporate independent political expenditures, and allows companies to spend
unlimited sums from corporate treasuries to expressly advocate the election or defeat
of a political candidate.5 The Citizens United decision effectively held that no
“sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit
or for-profit corporations.”6 The Citizens United decision not only struck down the
Federal prohibition on independent political spending, it also effectively struck down
laws in twenty-four states that had long banned or restricted independent corporate
expenditures.7
A recent case from the Montana Supreme Court, Western Tradition Partnership,
Inc. v. AG,8 challenged that assertion and distinguished Citizens United by stating
that “[Citizens United] considered the constitutionality of Federal statutes and
regulations that prohibited corporations from ‘electioneering’ (making a
communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office) within
30 days of a primary election or 60 days of a general election,” and further stated
that “Citizens United was a case decided upon its facts, and involved ‘unique and
complex’ rules that affected . . . different types of speech in Federal elections.”9
This Article is timely, especially since the Supreme Court recently granted
certiorari and summarily reversed the Montana Supreme Court in American
Tradition Partnership v. Bullock.10 The Supreme Court held that “Montana’s
arguments in support of the judgment [in Western Tradition Partnership] either were
already rejected in Citizens United, or fail to meaningfully distinguish that case.”11
The Article discusses why the Supreme Court should not have summarily reversed
the Montana Supreme Court’s decision

4
Id. The Court held that “that the Government may not suppress political speech on the
basis of the speaker’s corporate identity. No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits
on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.” Id. at 798-99. It is important
to note that the Citizens United decision did not alter the Congressional prohibitions on direct
corporate or union contributions to candidates as upheld by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976) (per curiam).
5
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. Independent Political Expenditures are defined
as “an expenditure by a person expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate which is made without cooperation or consultation with any candidate, or
any authorized committee or agent of such candidate, and which is not made in concert with,
or at the request or suggestion of, any candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such
candidate.” 2 U.S.C.A. § 431(17) (West 2013).
6

See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.

7

See Life After Citizens United, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19607#laws (last updated Jan. 4, 2011) (noting that
while Citizens United did not directly strike down state laws, “[m]any of these states are
looking at repealing or re-writing these laws to avoid legal challenges”).
8

W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 271 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2011).

9

Id. at 6.

10

Am. Tradition P'ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).

11

Id.
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The Article begins by discussing the holding in the Western Tradition
Partnership case and analyzing both the majority and dissenting opinions. The
Article then transitions into an empirical study of the current campaign finance
landscape by specifically looking at: states’ unique histories of corruption, the lack
of transparency with regard to corporate political expenditures, the public perception
of corruption in corporate political spending practices, the independence of super
PACs, the influence of political dark money, and 501(c)(4) organizations and shell
corporations being used to circumvent campaign finance disclosure rules and Federal
tax laws.
The Article concludes by listing additional arguments in favor of the Supreme
Court revisiting Citizens United including: the breadth of the First Amendment, the
idea of corporations being “creatures of the state,” the ability of PACs to allow
corporate political participation, the issue of a state’s power to exclude foreign
corporations from participation in their democratic political institutions, shareholder
protection, the treatment of public unions, and the Supreme Court’s long-standing
history of altering constitutional doctrine when its understanding of the doctrine’s
factual underpinnings no longer appear to be accurate.
II. WESTERN TRADITION PARTNERSHIP DECISION
Western Tradition Partnership, Inc. (WTP),12 Champion Painting, Inc. (CPI),13
and Montana Shooting Sports Foundation (MSSF)14 sued the Montana Attorney
General, specifically seeking a declaration that Montana Code § 13-35-227(1)
(Montana Statute) violated their freedom of speech protected by the United States
and Montana Constitutions by prohibiting political expenditures by corporations on
behalf of or opposing candidates for public office.15
The Montana Statute states that “[a] corporation may not make a contribution or
an expenditure in connection with a candidate or a political committee that supports
or opposes a candidate or a political party.”16 This section does not “prohibit the
establishment or administration of a separate, segregated fund to be used for making
political contributions or expenditures if the fund consists only of voluntary
contributions solicited from an individual who is a shareholder, employee, or
member of the corporation.”17
12

WTP is an entity incorporated in Colorado in 2008 and registered to do business in
Montana. Western Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 4. According to the Montana Supreme
Court, “its purpose is to act as a conduit of funds for persons and entities including
corporations who want to spend money anonymously to influence Montana elections.” Id.
13

CPI is incorporated under the laws of Montana. Id. “It is a single proprietor painting
and drywall business with no employees or members, and its sole shareholder is Kenneth
Champion.” Id.
14

“MSSF is a voluntary association of persons who support and promote firearm safety,
shooting sports, education, shooting facilities and Second Amendment rights.” Id. It was
incorporated in 1990. Id. “It has no employees or shareholders and its funding comes
primarily from member dues and donations from other organizations.” Id.
15

Id. at 3.

16

MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-227(1) (2011).

17

MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-227(3) (2011).
committees or “PACs.”
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At the district court level, the court considered whether the Montana Statute
violated the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to the extent that it restricted
corporations from making independent corporate expenditures on behalf of
candidates.18 The district court applied Citizens United, and determined that the
Montana Statute impacted corporations’ political speech protected by the United
States Constitution.19 The district court then considered whether the government had
demonstrated a compelling interest for the restriction on speech, and whether the
restriction was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.20
The district court answered both questions in the negative and held that “Citizens
United is unequivocal: the government may not prohibit independent and indirect
corporate expenditures on political speech.”21 The district court declared the statute
unconstitutional and granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs.22 The defendants
appealed the district Court's order. It is important to note that under Montana law,
corporations are allowed to make independent expenditures on ballot issues.23 That
issue was not challenged and, therefore, was not before the court.
A. Majority Opinion
The Montana Supreme Court (Montana Court) stated that the lower district court
“erroneously construed and applied the Citizens United case” and that “Citizens
United was decided under its facts or lack of facts.”24 The Montana Court held that
the U.S. Supreme Court (Supreme Court) had applied the rule that restrictions upon
speech “are not per se unlawful, but rather may be upheld if the government
demonstrates a sufficiently strong interest.”25 The Montana Court also held that the
U.S. Supreme Court applied the highest level of scrutiny to the law restricting
political speech, requiring the government to prove that the law furthers a
compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to that interest, and that the “factual
record before a court is critical to determining the validity of a governmental
provision restricting speech.”26 The Montana Court emphasized that the case before

18

See W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., No. BDV-2010-238, 2010 Mont. Dist.
LEXIS 412, at *1 (1st Dist. Mont. Oct. 18, 2010).
19

Id. at *9.

20

Id. at *13.

21

Id. at *18 (quoting Minn. Chamber of Commerce v. Gaertner, 710 F. Supp. 2d 868, 873
(D. Minn. 2010))
22

W. Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 3.

23

Mont. Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright, 226 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2000).

24

W. Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 12, 13.

25

Id. at 6 (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010)).
This test derives from the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence. See, e.g., Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 273-274 (1986); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S.
81, 100 (1943).
26

W. Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 6.
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them was distinguishable from Citizens United because it concerned Montana law
and political elections, and it arose from Montana history.27
The first issue the Montana Court analyzed was the effect that the Montana
Statute had on the political activity and speech of WTP, CPI, and MSSF.28 The
Montana Court found that none of the organizations could demonstrate any way in
which Montana law hindered or censored their political activity or speech.29
Conversely, based upon affidavits and depositions submitted, all three organizations
were actively involved in Montana politics.30
MSSF contended that that even though Montana law allowed MSSF to obtain
and spend donations from other organizations on political activities, it did not allow
MSSF to use dues paid by its members for the same purpose.31 The Montana Court
found that no such distinction appeared in Montana law and that MSSF failed to
demonstrate that its speech was impaired by the statute.32 CPI’s owner, Kenneth
Champion, contended that a candidate endorsement by CPI would be more
persuasive than his personal endorsement.33 The Montana Court did not find this
argument persuasive; the court stated that Champion is the sole shareholder of CPI
and while Montana law forbids the expenditure of CPI’s corporate funds to support
or oppose candidates, the burden upon Champion, as sole shareholder, to establish a
PAC to advocate for CPI’s interests and expend funds were minimal.34 With regard
to WTP, the Montana Court found that WTP was not a business corporation and was
not forthcoming about its business practices.35 The Montana Court held that
“[o]rganizations like WTP that act as conduits for anonymous spending by others
represent a threat to the ‘political marketplace’” and that “[b]ecause WTP has not
disclosed its operation, it is difficult to determine how it might be impacted by the
Montana Statute, but given the evidence presented below we will assume there is a
direct impact.”36
The next issue the Montana Court analyzed was the regulatory burden imposed
by the Montana Statute. The court held that there was a “material factual distinction
between the present case and Citizens United,” with regard to the regulatory burden
imposed.37 In Citizens United, the U.S. Supreme Court found that PACs are
“burdensome alternatives; they are expensive to administer and subject to extensive

27

Id. This idea of Montana’s unique political history was a theme throughout the
Montana Court’s decision. Id.
28

Id. at 4.

29

Id.

30

Id. at 6.

31

Id. at 4.

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id. at 7.

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id.
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regulations.”38 The U.S. Supreme Court further held that PACs have to comply with
onerous regulations just to speak and that fewer than 2,000 corporations in the
United States have PACs.39
In Montana, the regulations governing the formation and maintenance of PACs
can be found in Montana Code sections 13-37-201 and 13-35-402.40 The Montana
Court found that unlike the federal rules for PACs, Montana law reflects that PACs
can “be formed and maintained by filing simple and straight-forward forms or
reports.”41 MSSF, by its own admission, had established its own PACs and used
them to actively participate in the Montana political process.42 The Montana Court
further found that the evidence submitted by the government demonstrated that
corporations, through their PACs, have been active participants in Montana
politics.43
The next issue that the Montana Court analyzed was whether the law at issue
could “be understood outside the context of the time and place it was enacted.”44
The court described how at the time the Montana Statute was enacted, Montana
political contests “were marked by rough contests for political and economic
domination . . . between mining and industrial enterprises controlled by foreign
trusts or corporations.”45 The Montana Court discussed fights for mineral rights
between companies and corruption throughout the Montana political system in the
early twentieth century.46
The Montana Court focused on the story of W. A. Clark, who had amassed a
fortune from industrial operations in Montana.47 In 1899, the Montana Legislature
elected Clark to the U.S. Senate. However, subsequent to his election, Clark
admitted to spending $272,000 dollars in the effort and the estimated expense was
over $400,000 dollars.48 Complaints of Clark's bribery of the Montana Legislature
led to an investigation by the U.S. Senate in 1900. The Senate investigating
committee “concluded that Clark had won his seat through bribery and unseated him.
The Senate committee ‘expressed horror at the amount of money which had been
poured into politics in Montana elections . . . and expressed its concern with respect
to the general aura of corruption in Montana.’”49 Clark testified in the U.S. Senate
38

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 897 (2010).

39

Id. (citing Brief for Seven Former Chairmen of Fed. Election Comm’n et al., as Amici
Curiae 11).
40

Western Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 7.

41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id. at 8.

45

Id.

46

Id. at 8-9.

47

Id. at 8.

48

Id.

49

Id. (citing K. ROSS TOOLE, MONTANA, AN UNCOMMON LAND 186-94 (1959)).
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that “‘[m]any people [had] become so indifferent to voting’ in Montana as a result of
the ‘large sums of money that [had] been expended in the state.’”50
The Montana Court also relied upon an affidavit from history professor Dr. Harry
Fritz. Dr. Fritz reported that the “‘dangers of corporate influence remain in
Montana’ because the resources upon which its economy depends in turn depend
upon distant markets. He affirmed: ‘What was true a century ago is as true today:
distant corporate interests mean that corporate dominated campaigns will only work
in the essential interest of outsiders with local interests a very secondary
consideration.’”51 Bob Brown, a former long-time Montana legislator, submitted an
affidavit attesting that “Montana politics are more susceptible to corruption than
Federal campaigns, and that infusions of large amounts of corporate independent
expenditure on just media coverage ‘could accomplish the same type of corruption
of Montana politics as that which led to the enactment of’ [the Montana Statute].”52
Edwin Bender, Executive Director of the National Institute on Money in State
Politics, affirmed that “the low cost of political races in Montana, in comparison to
other states,” makes it possible for direct political spending by corporations to
significantly affect the outcome of elections.53
The Montana Court found that based upon the history of the Montana Statute,
Montana citizens had a compelling interest to enact the challenged statute in 1912.54
The court questioned if or when did Montana lose the power or interest sufficient to
support the Montana Statute.55 The court used a clever analogy by asking whether a
state would “have to repeal or invalidate its murder prohibition if the homicide rate
decline[d]?”56
The Montana Court also found that “[w]hile Montana has a clear interest in
preserving the integrity of its electoral process, it also has an interest in encouraging
the full participation of the Montana electorate.”57 The court discussed the affidavit
submitted by Edwin Bender which “demonstrate[d] that individual voter
contributions are diminished from 48 percent of the total raised by candidates in
states where a corporate spending ban has been in place to 23 percent of the total
raised by candidates in states that permit unlimited corporate spending.”58 Based
upon this evidence, the Montana Court found that “the impact of unlimited corporate
donations creates a dominating impact on the political process and inevitably
minimizes the impact of individual citizens.”59

50

Id. at 7 (citing K. ROSS TOOLE, MONTANA, AN UNCOMMON LAND 184-85 (1959)).

51

Id. at 9.

52

Id. at 10.

53

Id.

54

Id. at 11.

55

Id.

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id. at 12.
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The Montana Court concluded that the Montana Statute was constitutional
because it demonstrated a compelling interest for the restriction on speech, and the
restriction was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.60 The court held that
“Citizens United does not compel a conclusion that Montana's law prohibiting
independent political expenditures by a corporation related to a candidate is
unconstitutional. Rather, applying the principles enunciated in Citizens United, it is
clear that Montana has a compelling interest to impose the challenged rationallytailored statutory restrictions.”61
B. Dissenting Opinion
The dissent argued that corporations have broad rights under the First
Amendment and even though the Montana Attorney General identified compelling
reasons for limiting corporate expenditures, the Supreme Court, in Citizens United,
had already rebuffed each reason.62 It is interesting to note that in the dissent, Justice
Nelson went to great lengths to show that he disagreed with the rationale used in
Citizens United, but believed that the Montana Court was bound to enforce the
Supreme Court’s decision.63
The dissent briefly discussed the Citizens United decision and provided a detailed
comparison of the rationales provided by the majority and the Supreme Court. First,
the dissent discussed the majority’s argument that PACs in Montana are easy to
create and maintain.64 The Supreme Court in Citizens United rejected PACs, in part,
because they were subject to burdensome and expensive start-up costs and filing fees
under Federal regulations.65 However, the dissent noted that the Supreme Court
specifically stated that “[a] PAC is a separate association from the corporation. So
the PAC exemption from the [law’s] expenditure ban does not allow corporations to
speak.”66 The dissent contended that even though PACs are easier to create and
maintain under Montana law, the Supreme Court explicitly found that PACs were
separate entities and could not speak for the corporation.67
Second, the dissent discussed the majority’s anti-corruption rationale.68 The
dissent discussed the majority’s view of corporate domination and corrupt influence
throughout the history of Montana politics.69 The dissent found this argument
unpersuasive and argued that “The [U.S.] Supreme Court unequivocally repudiated
60

Id. at 13.

61

Id.

62

Id. at 14 (Nelson, J., dissenting).

63

Id. at 18 (“I agree, at least in principle, with much of the Court’s discussion and with the
arguments of the Attorney General.”).
64

Id. at 88.

65

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 897 (2010).

66

W. Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 21 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (citing Citizens United,
130 S. Ct. at 897).
67

Id.

68

Id. at 89.

69

Id. at 90.
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the notion that corporate political speech can be restricted ‘as a means to prevent
corporations from obtaining an unfair advantage in the political marketplace by
using resources amassed in the economic marketplace.’”70 The dissent also argued
that the U.S. Supreme Court specifically found that “independent expenditures,
including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the
appearance of corruption” and that a “sufficiently important governmental interest in
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption . . . was limited to quid pro
quo corruption.”71
The dissent also rejected the majority’s argument that Citizens United was
decided upon a “unique” set of facts and only applied to federal elections. The
dissent stated that “Bellotti72 did not address the constitutionality of the State’s ban
on corporate independent expenditures to support candidates. In our view, however,
that restriction would have been unconstitutional.”73 The dissent argued that this
language reflects that the prohibition on corporate independent political expenditures
would not pass constitutional muster, regardless of whether it is a federal or state
law.74
Third, the dissent discussed the majority’s citizen protection (anti-distortion)
rationale. The dissent discussed the majority’s view that allowing corporations to
spend an unlimited amount of money in Montana political elections would leave
average citizens unable to complete and would create the perception that their
support did not matter.75 The dissent found this argument unpersuasive and stated
that “the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment.”76 The dissent further stated that “[t]he rule that political speech
cannot be limited based on a speaker’s wealth is a necessary consequence of the
premise that the First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of political
speech based on the speaker’s identity.”77 Based upon these statements, the dissent
found the majority’s anti-distortion theory to be invalid under Citizens United.78
Fourth, the dissent discussed the majority’s interest in protecting its system of
elected judges. The dissent discussed the majority’s view that Montana judicial
elections were particularly vulnerable to large levels of corporate spending and
would affect the public’s perception of judicial impartiality.79 The dissent argued
that the majority’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in Caperton v. A.T.
70

Id. at 27-28 (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904).

71

Id. at 28 (citing Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909).

72

First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).

73

W. Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 28 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (quoting Citizens
United, 130 S. Ct. at 903).
74

Id. at 33 (Nelson, J., dissenting).

75

Id. at 35 (Nelson, J., dissenting).

76

Id. at 22 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904).

77

Id. at 30 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905).

78

Id. at 29-30 (Nelson, J., dissenting).

79

Id. at 30 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
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Massey Coal80 was misguided. The dissent stated that “Caperton held that a judge
was required to recuse himself ‘when a person with a personal stake in a particular
case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case
by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was
pending or imminent.’”81 The dissent further argued that the Supreme Court stated
in Citizens United that “Caperton’s holding was limited to the rule that the judge
must be recused, not that the litigant’s political speech could be banned” and that
recusal was the remedy for protecting the due process rights of litigants, not banning
corporate speech.82 The dissent also relied on the Supreme Court’s rationale in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,83 which stated that “the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s canon of judicial conduct (the “announce clause”) prohibiting candidates for
judicial election from announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues
violated the First Amendment.”84
The dissent concluded by stating that the majority was misguided in its attempt to
craft a theory of Montana being a unique situation and Citizens United only applying
to federal elections.85 The dissent found that the Montana Statute was facially
unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s holding in Citizens United.86
III. WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED
It is instructive to look at the Montana Court’s holding in Western Tradition
Partnership and see how they distinguished it from the Supreme Court’s holding in
Citizens United. As noted above, the Montana Court emphasized that the case
before them was distinguishable from Citizens United because it concerned Montana
law and political elections and it arose from Montana history.87 The Montana Court
focused on three issues where Montana’s political climate and laws are
distinguishable from Citizens United. The first issue is that forming a PAC under
Montana law is not as burdensome as the formation of a PAC under federal law.
The second issue is that, unlike the federal government in Citizens United, the
Montana government was able to demonstrate a compelling state interest for the
prohibition on corporate independent political spending, including anti-corruption
and anti-distortion interests. The third issue is that the Montana Court relied on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Caperton, and held that the interest in protecting the
independence of the Montana judiciary was paramount.
80

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).

81
W. Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 30 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (quoting Caperton, 129
S. Ct. at 2263-64).
82

Id. (Nelson, J., dissenting) (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910).

83

Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002).

84

W. Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 31 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (citing White, 536 U.S.
at 788).
85

Id. at 110.

86

Id.

87

Id. at 15; see Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (plurality opinion) (“[a]
ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people.”);
see also Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 289 (1921) (a “statute may
be invalid as applied to one state of facts and yet valid as applied to another.”).
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A. Distinguishing Citizens United
The Montana Court held that Citizens United was decided upon its facts and
involved “unique and complex” rules that govern speech in Federal elections.88 The
court also made the important point that restrictions upon speech are not per se
unlawful and may be upheld if the government can demonstrate a sufficiently strong
interest.89 The Montana Court relied on the Supreme Court’s endorsement of FEC v.
Wisconsin Right to Life,90 which “clearly endorsed an analysis of restrictions on
speech, placing the burden upon the government to establish a compelling interest.”91
1. Ease of Creating a PAC
The first distinction the Montana Court made was that the regulatory burden in
Montana for creation of a PAC is far less burdensome then the federal regulatory
burden. Under federal law, PACs must “appoint a treasurer, forward donations to
the treasurer promptly, keep detailed records of the identities of the persons making
donations, preserve receipts for three years, and file an organization statement and
report changes to this information within 10 days.”92 In contrast, under Montana
law, a PAC can be formed and maintained by filing simple and straight-forward
forms and reports.93 The Montana Court also relied on evidence that MSSF had
established multiple PACs and used them to participate in the Montana political
process and that Kenneth Champion, as sole shareholder of CPI, could easily
establish a PAC to advocate for the corporation’s interests.94
The dissent emphasizes that even though the Supreme Court relied in part on the
regulatory burden imposed by federal law, they went further to say that a “PAC is a
separate association from the corporation” and “the option to form PACs does not
alleviate the First Amendment problems.95 Even though the Supreme Court
specifically states that PACs do not allow a corporation to speak,96 the language
cited by the Montana Court seems to indicate that if the regulatory burden to
establish a PAC under federal law was not so onerous, a prohibition on corporate
political expenditures may not violate the First Amendment. The ability of PACs to
speak for corporations is discussed later in this Article.97

88

W. Tradition P’Ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 5.

89

Id. at 6 (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010);
Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 251-52 (1986)).
90

Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007).

91

W. Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 6 (citing Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898).

92

McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 330-32 (2003) (quoting Mass.
Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. at 253-54).
93

Western Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 19.

94

Id. at 20.

95

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897.

96

Id.

97

See infra Part V.B.
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2. Compelling State Interests
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court applied the rule that restrictions upon
speech “are not per se unlawful, but rather may be upheld if the government
demonstrates a sufficiently strong interest.”98 This requires the government to prove
that the law furthers a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to that
interest. The Montana Court found that the “factual record before a court is critical
to determining the validity of a governmental provision restricting speech.”99 The
court concluded that the Montana Statute was constitutional because the government
had demonstrated a compelling interest for the restriction on speech, and the
restriction was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.100 The Montana Court
relied on two rationales for their conclusion: an anti-corruption rationale and an antidistortion rationale.
a. Anti-Corruption Rationale
The Montana Court spent considerable time discussing how the Montana Statute
could not “be understood outside the context of the time and place it was enacted.”101
The court described how at the time the Montana Statute was enacted, Montana
political contests “were marked by rough contests for political and economic
domination . . . between mining and industrial enterprises controlled by foreign
trusts or corporations.”102 The court relied on affidavits reflecting that corporate
dominated campaigns will only work in the essential interest of outsiders with local
interests a very secondary consideration. and that Montana politics are more
susceptible to corruption than federal campaigns.103
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court made a blanket statement that
“independent expenditures do not lead to, or create the appearance of, quid pro quo
corruption.”104 They relied on the record in McConnell to show that there were no
direct examples of votes being exchanged for candidate-centered issue advocacy
expenditures.105 This issue will be discussed in greater detail later in this Article.106
b. Anti-Distortion Rationale
The Montana Court also discussed the distorting effect that would be created by
allowing unlimited corporate expenditures. The court found that “[w]hile Montana
has a clear interest in preserving the integrity of its electoral process, it also has an
98

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898.

99

W. Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 6.

100

Id. at 40.

101

Id.

102

Id. at 8.

103

Id. at 20.

104
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010). (emphasis in
original).
105

Id. (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 560 (D.D.C.
2003)).
106

See infra Part IV.E.
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interest in encouraging the full participation of the Montana electorate.”107 The court
relied upon data showing that “individual voter contributions are diminished from 48
percent of the total raised by candidates in states where a corporate spending ban has
been in place to 23 percent of the total raised by candidates in states that permit
unlimited corporate spending.”108
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court found that “[i]f the anti-distortion
rationale were to be accepted, however, it would permit Government to ban political
speech simply because the speaker is an association that has taken on the corporate
form.”109 The Supreme Court further held that the government does not have “an
interest ‘in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the
outcome of elections.’”110
3. Reliance on Caperton
The Montana Court relied on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Caperton and
held that Montana had a compelling interest in protecting its system of elected
judges. The court found that Montana judicial elections were particularly vulnerable
to large levels of corporate spending and would affect the public’s perception of
judicial impartiality.111 The court further found that “the free speech rights of the
corporations are no more important than the due process rights of litigants in
Montana courts to a fair and independent judiciary, and both are constitutionally
protected.”112
In Caperton, the Supreme Court found that a judge was required to recuse
himself “when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant
and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or
directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.”113
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court held that “Caperton’s holding was limited to
the rule that the judge must be recused, not that the litigant’s political speech could
be banned” and that recusal was the remedy for protecting the due process rights of
litigants, not banning corporate speech.114 However, the Supreme Court in Caperton
stated that large independent expenditures in support of a judicial candidate could
create a serious, objective risk of actual bias that violated an opposing litigant‘s due
process rights and that even though there was no allegation of a quid pro quo
agreement, Justice Benjamin would nevertheless feel a debt of gratitude to
Blankenship for the extraordinary efforts to get him elected.115

107

W. Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 11.

108

Id.

109

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904.

110

Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (per curiam)).

111

W. Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 12.

112

Id. at 12.

113

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263-64 (2009).

114

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.

115

Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2262.
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IV. CAMPAIGN FINANCE EMPIRICAL CASE STUDY
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court made blanket statements concerning
corporate independent expenditures. The Supreme Court stated that “independent
expenditures do not lead to, or create the appearance of, quid pro quo corruption”
and “[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the
candidate or his agent . . . alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a
quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”116 The Supreme Court
also held that “[n]o sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political
speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”117 This part analyzes the current
available data to see whether these statements made by the Supreme Court are
supported by the evidence.
A. States’ “Unique” Histories
The Montana Court emphasized that the case before them was distinguishable
from Citizens United, because it concerned Montana law and political elections, and
it arose from Montana history.118 The court held that Montana political elections are
different because of the history of corruption and corporate domination.119 As of
January 2010, twenty-four states had laws that prohibited or restricted independent
corporate political expenditures.120
For example, Arizona enacted the Clean Elections Act121 in 1998 after a political
scandal that saw ten percent of the Arizona state legislature indicted on corruptionrelated charges.122 In 1991, the political scandal “rocked the state as a grand jury
charged seven legislators, five lobbyists and five others with felonies including
bribery, money laundering and filing false campaign statements.”123
In 1996, the Alaska legislature “enacted sweeping reforms to its campaign
finance system. Corruption and the appearance of corruption had led to low voter
turnout and widespread disillusionment with the electoral system.”124 The
116

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 902.

117

Id. at 913.

118

W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 15 (Mont. 2011).

119

See id.

120

Life After Citizens United, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Mar. 2, 2013),
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19607#laws. The states include: Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.
121

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-941 (2012).

122
A Brief History of Corruption Leading to Arizona Voters’ Adoption of the Clean
Elections System, ARIZ. ADVOCACY NETWORK (Mar. 2, 2013), http://stoptheazpower
grab.com/files/Brief_History_of_Corruption_in_AZ_Politics.pdf (“In 1991, Arizona Voters
witnessed nearly 10 percent of their State legislature indicted on corruption-related charges in
a scandal that came to be known as AzScam. Video of the sting showed legislators stuffing
tens of thousands of dollars into gym bags while making comments such as, “I sold way too
cheap’ and ‘There’s not an issue in the world I give a [expletive] about.’”).
123

Scandal in Phoenix, TIME MAG., Feb. 18, 1991.

124

Jacobus v. Alaska, 338 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2003).
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subsequent investigation was headed by the Public Integrity Section of the U.S.
Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS).125 The investigation looked “into political corruption of
lawmakers in the Alaska State Legislature, focusing in particular on lawmakers'
official actions in relation to the oil industry, fisheries, and private corrections
industry.”126 As of May 2007, the investigation had resulted in indictments against
four current and former Alaska state legislators on corruption charges.127 In 2003,
FBI agents, posing as employees of a fake company, asked members of the
Tennessee legislature to support legislation that would advance the company's
business in Tennessee. The legislators agreed to do so if they were to be paid for
their introduction of legislation.128
In Missouri, in the early 1990s, a reporter, Terry Ganey, uncovered a scandal
involving campaign contributions directed to the Missouri Attorney General,
William L. Webster, who was running for governor at the time.129 In Missouri, the
Second Injury Fund was supposed to supplement worker’s compensation benefits for
injuries suffered on the job.130 Ganey found that “unusually large contributions were
flowing to Attorney General Webster's campaign for re-election from a small group
of St. Louis lawyers filling claims against the fund.”131 The investigation uncovered
that lawyers who contributed to Webster had obtained much larger settlements from
the fund for their clients than those lawyers who did not contribute to his
campaign.132 Ganey accomplished this by analyzing information from Second Injury
Fund documents and compared them with Webster’s campaign disclosure reports.133
The two main lawyers behind the scandal pled guilty to charges that they conspired
to use the Second Injury Fund to raise campaign contributions for Webster;
subsequently they testified against Webster and he was sentenced to two years in
prison.134
In the 2008 Oregon state elections, the Public Employees Local 503 Union,
whose parent organization is Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”),
provided $320,958 dollars to John Kroger, who was running for Attorney General of
Oregon; Kroger ended up winning the election.135 Attorney General Kroger
125
Alaska Political Corruption Probe, SUNSHINE REVIEW (Mar. 2, 2013), http://sunshine
review.org/index.php/Alaska_political_corruption_probe#cite_note-mauer-probeledby-10.
126

Id.

127

Id.

128
John Branston, U.S. Indicts 4 Tennessee Lawmakers in Corruption Case, N.Y. TIMES,
May 27, 2005.
129

Terry Ganey, How Post Reporter Uncovered Second Injury Fund Scandal, ST. LOUIS
DISPATCH, Mar. 1, 1994.
130

Id.

131

Id.

132

Id.

133

Id.

134

Id.

135

Oregon 2008: Contributors, FOLLOW THE MONEY (2008), http://www.followthemoney.
org/database/StateGlance/contributor.phtml?d=600611244.
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subsequently appointed a former SEIU attorney to oversee elections.136 At the very
least, this action raises the specter of quid pro quo corruption. i.e., rewarding a large
expenditure with a favorable position in the new administration.
In Connecticut, from 1998 to 2002, TBI Construction, a construction company
run by the Tomasso family, received construction contracts worth more than $100
million dollars in exchange for contributing over $400,000 dollars to Governor John
Rowland’s re-election campaigns.137 TBI was awarded a $37 million dollar no-bid
contract in March 1999 and a $52 million dollar no-bid contract in May 1999.138
Governor Rowland also appointed TBI’s president to the juvenile justice advisory
panel that advised the Connecticut government on policy and funding, although he
seemed to lack the qualifications or experience to service on the panel.139 It is
important to note that all of the contributions themselves were legal under
Connecticut law.140
For the Montana Court, they found that the government was able to show not
only that a compelling state interest existed at the time the Montana Statute was
enacted, but they were also able to show that the factors that led to the corruption
were still present today.141 A state must show that, regardless of the language used
by the Supreme Court in Citizens United, corporate independent expenditures can
lead to corruption. This Article provides ample empirical evidence that even though
an expenditure is not directly “coordinated” with a candidate, it can still lead the
candidate to favor the corporation making the expenditures and rewarding those
contributors.142
Many states legislatures have also issued resolutions voicing their disagreement
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United. In Idaho, the state legislature
urged Congress “to affirm the power of the states to set limits, through lawmaking or
constitutional amendment, on all forms of contributions and expenditures made by
corporations and labor organizations to influence the outcome of elections in the
states.”143 In Kentucky, the state legislature expressed “deep disappointment over
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Citizens United,” and
stated that the “the framers of the Kentucky Constitution recognized the possibility
that corporate spending could corrupt and distort the electoral process.”144 In New
Jersey, the state legislature expressed “strong opposition to U.S. Supreme Court
136
Larry Huss, The Corruption of Campaign Contributions, OR. CATALYST (Dec. 31,
2008), http://oregoncatalyst.com/1955-The-Corruption-of-Campaign-Contributions.html.
137
CONN. COMMON CAUSE, THE ROWLAND CORRUPTION TRAIL BEGINS ON THE CAMPAIGN
TRAIL (Jan. 30, 2004), available at http://www.commoncause.org/atf/cf/%7BFB3C17E2CDD1-4DF6-92BE-BD4429893665%7D/Corruption%20Trail.pdf.
138

Id. at 4.

139

Id.

140

Id.

141

See W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 271 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2011).

142

The issue of explicit and implicit coordination between candidates and PACs will be
discussed in greater detail later in the Article.
143

H.J. Memorial 12, 2010 Leg. 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2010).

144

2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2010).
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decision in Citizens United,” and requested that Congress “propose an amendment to
the United States Constitution to provide that, with respect to corporation campaign
spending, a person is only a natural person for First Amendment protection of free
speech.”145
In Pennsylvania, the state legislature urged Congress to amend the U.S.
Constitution to state that “[e]ach State shall have the power to limit the contributions
to or expenditures by any person or committee made in support of, in opposition to,
or to influence the nomination or election of any person to State or local office.”146
In South Dakota, the state legislature called upon Congress to “propose and to ratify
a constitutional amendment that would reverse the Supreme Court's decision in the
case of [Citizens United] in order to protect our democracy from undue corporate
influence and ensure that the people continue to have a voice in the operation of
government.”147 In Washington, the state legislature requested that Congress
“transmit to the several states for ratification an amendment to the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution so that corporations will not be
considered as persons for the purposes of electioneering communications or direct
contributions to candidates for public office.”148
Many states have unique histories and circumstances that require different
standards for regulating political elections. Courts have determined that a one-sizefits-all approach is not appropriate in all cases affecting constitutional rights
including Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases149 and Fifth Amendment due
process cases.150 The Court should have extended this same type of factual specific
analysis to its holding in Citizens United.
B. Lack of Transparency
One reason why the Supreme Court should have revisited the holding in Citizens
United is the empirical data reflecting the difficulty of obtaining evidence of
corruption or the appearance of corruption due to the lack of transparency
concerning corporate independent political expenditures. The Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) provides that any person who spends more than
$10,000 on electioneering communications within a calendar year must file a
disclosure statement with the FEC.151 The BCRA also provides that the statement
must identify the person making the expenditure, the amount of the expenditure, the
election to which the communication was directed, and the names of certain
contributors.152 Even with the disclosure provisions of the BCRA, the Supreme
Court in McConnell found that “[t]here was evidence in the record that independent

145

Assembly R. 64, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010).

146

H.R. 653, 2010 Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2010).

147

H.R. Con. Res 1018, 2010 Leg., 85th Sess. (S. D. 2010).

148

S.J. Memorial 8027, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess.. (Wash. 2010).

149

See, e.g., United States v. McGregor, 650 F.3d 813 (1st Cir. 2011).

150

See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43 (1993).

151

2 U.S.C.A. § 434(f)(1) (West 2002).

152

2 U.S.C.A. § 434(f)(2) (West 2002).
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groups were running election-related advertisements ‘while hiding behind dubious
and misleading names.’”153
In FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, the Supreme Court held that the prohibition
on corporate independent political expenditures was invalid as applied to
expenditures that did not constitute “express advocacy” or the “functional equivalent
of express advocacy.”154 The Court explained that a communication is the
“functional equivalent of express advocacy” only if it “is susceptible of no
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific
candidate.”155 In 2007, the FEC promulgated rules to implement the Supreme
Court’s holding in Wisconsin Right to Life. The FEC rule provided that disclosure
would only be mandated for disbursements that were “made for the purpose of
furthering electioneering communications.”156 The FEC reasoned that organizations
may have funding sources other than donations and that those persons may not
support the electioneering communications and that compliance with the disclosure
requirements would impose a burden on those organizations.157
In March 2012, in Van Hollen v. FEC, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia found in favor of a plaintiff who challenged the FEC regulation regarding
disclosure by corporations and unions that fund “electioneering communications.”158
The Court held that the language of the BCRA disclosure provision was not
ambiguous, and “there [was] no question that the regulation promulgated by the FEC
directly contravenes the Congressional goal of increasing transparency disclosure in
electioneering communications.”159 The Court further held that the disclosure
provision plainly required every person who funds electioneering communications to
disclose contributors who contributed more than $1,000 during the reporting period
and that “there are no terms limiting that requirement to call only for the names of
those who transmitted funds accompanied by an express statement that the
contribution was intended for the purpose” of making electioneering
communications.160
It is unclear how the recent decision in Van Hollen will affect the corporate
independent disclosure regime implemented by FEC regulations. It is important to
note that even though Citizens United invalidated any prohibition on corporate
independent political expenditures, it left the disclosure provision of the BCRA
intact.161 The Supreme Court held that that disclosure “would help citizens ‘make
153
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010) (quoting
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 197 (2003)).
154

Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 470-76 (2007).

155

Id. at 470.

156

11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9) (2011).

157

Explanation and Justification for Final Rules on Electioneering Communications, 72
Fed. Reg. 72,899 (Dec. 26, 2007).
158

See Van Hollen v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 851 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D.D.C. 2012).

159

Id.

160

Id.

161

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 915 (2010).
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informed choices in the political marketplace.’”162 However, the evidence reflects
that the reality of political expenditures is that they are shrouded in secrecy and lack
the transparency referenced by the Supreme Court.
In an April 2012 Washington Post study, politically active non-profit groups that
did not reveal their funding sources spent $28.5 million dollars on advertising related
to the 2012 presidential race, or about 90 percent of the total through April 21,
2012.163 The study reflects that there is a shift away from PACs, which are required
to disclose their donors to the FEC, and instead, the 2012 presidential race was likely
dominated by non-profit organizations that did not have to identify their financial
backers.164 These non-profit organizations are able to circumvent the disclosure laws
because “their ads are considered ‘issue ads’ [and] they do not specifically urge
viewers to vote for a particular candidate. The strategy allows them to conform to
[IRS] rules for ‘social welfare’ groups, which do not have to disclose their donors as
long as their ‘primary purpose’ is not politics.”165 These social welfare groups will
be discussed in further detail later in the Article.166
It is interesting to note that Western Tradition Partnership actually prided itself
on the same type of secrecy that the Supreme Court in Citizens United cautioned
against. Western Tradition Partnership represented to contributors that there was no
limit to how much an individual or corporation could give, and that they were “not
required to report the name or the amount of any contribution that we receive . . . no
politician, no bureaucrat, and no radical environmentalist will ever know you helped
make this program possible.”167 This language is in direct contravention with the
statements made by the majority in Citizens United, specifically that “transparency
enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to
different speakers and messages.”168
C. Supreme Court’s Narrow View of Corruption
Corruption is defined as “covering a multitude of official delinquencies, great
and little; but it is strictly accurate to apply it to any color of influence, of mere
relation of any kind, on the administration of justice.”169 By analyzing the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence concerning independent political expenditures in the context
of the First Amendment, the overwhelming conclusion is that the Supreme Court has
a very narrow view of corruption in regard to corporate independent expenditures.
In Buckley, the Supreme Court found that because independent expenditures did
not give rise to quid pro quo corruption, they would not be recognized as a
162

Id. (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 197 (2003)).

163

Dan Eggen, Most Independent Ads for 2012 Election are from Groups that Don’t
Disclose Donors, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2012.
164

Id.

165

Id.

166

See infra Part IV.F.

167

W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 7 (Mont. 2011) (citing Western
Tradition Partnership, 2010 Election Year Program Executive Briefing).
168

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010).

169

BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010).
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compelling government interest to restrict corporate political speech.170 In
McConnell, the Court stated that the evidence did “‘not [show] any direct examples
of votes being exchanged for . . . expenditures.’”171 In Citizens United, the Court
held that “[w]hen Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to
quid pro quo corruption.”172
It is in this line of reasoning that the Supreme Court has distinguished
“contributions” and “independent expenditures,” with only the former raising a
concern for corruption.
However, the line between “contributions” and
“independent expenditures” is often blurred, and in Caperton, the Supreme Court
actually held them to be interchangeable by repeatedly referring to Blankenship's
spending on behalf of Justice Benjamin that consisted of 99.97% independent
expenditures ($3 million) and 0.03% direct contributions ($1,000) as
“contributions.”173 This issue will be discussed in further detail later in the Article.174
D. Public Perception
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court relied on its decision in Buckley by
holding that “the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption” are both
sufficiently important government interests.175 “[P]reventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling government
interests [] identified for restricting campaign finances.”176 The Supreme Court has
“long recognized ‘the governmental interest in preventing corruption and the
appearance of corruption’ in election campaigns.”177 This is an important distinction
for states to make when challenging Citizens United and states must emphasize that
under the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the “appearance of corruption” is a
compelling government interest.
The empirical evidence does not support the Supreme Court’s blanket statements
concerning corruption and the public perception of corruption. In a January 2010
170

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1976) (per curiam).

171

McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 560 (2003).

172

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909.

173

Id. at 967-68 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting in part and
concurring in part) (citing Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263-64
(2009)).
174

See infra Part IV.E.

175

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908.

176

Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 741 (2008) (quoting Fed. Election
Comm’n v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 490 (1985)); see also
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 268 (2006) (plurality opinion) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“the
interests the Court has recognized as compelling, i.e., the prevention of corruption or the
appearance thereof”); see also Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 29697 (1981) (“Buckley identified a single narrow exception to the rule that limits on political
activity were contrary to the First Amendment. The exception relates to the perception of
undue influence of large contributors to a candidate.”).
177

Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976) (per curiam)).
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Gallup poll, 55 percent of respondents agreed that corporations should be treated the
same as individuals under the campaign finance regulations; however, 76 percent
responded that there should be limits on corporate political spending.178 In a
February 2010 Washington Post-ABC News poll, nearly 80 percent of poll
respondents opposed the Citizens United decision to allow unfettered corporate
political spending, with 65 percent “strongly” opposed.179 In a February 2010
Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research poll, 64 percent of respondents opposed the
Citizens United decision.180
An April 2012 survey conducted by the Brennan Center for Justice found that 69
percent of those surveyed believed that the ability of corporations to give unlimited
amounts of money to PACs will lead to corruption.181 The survey also found that 65
percent of those surveyed said that they trusted the government less due to PACs
having more influence than regular voters.182 Ironically, in Citizens United, the
Supreme Court stated that the First Amendment was premised on mistrust of
governmental power and stood against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or
viewpoints.183
This data reflects that even though there was support for the Citizens United
decision immediately after it was announced, public support has decreased
tremendously over the past two years. The polls reflect that this change occurred,
because there is a majority belief that the ability of corporations and super PACs to
spend unlimited amounts of money in political elections will lead to corruption and
increasing mistrust of government officials.
There is also empirical data reflecting that even in states that imposed a ban or
placed limits on campaign contributions and independent expenditures, corporations
were still able to give to politicians indirectly. For example, in Louisiana,
companies are limited to making a $5,000 dollar contribution to a candidate per
election or $10,000 dollars for certain PACs.184 Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal’s
wife, Supriya Jindal, has a charitable foundation that provides equipment and
178

Lydia Saad, Public Agrees with Court: Campaign Money is ‘Free Speech, GALLUP
POLITICS (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/125333/Public-Agrees-CourtCampaign-Money-Free-Speech.aspx.
179
Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court's Decision on Campaign
Financing, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2010.
180

Greenberg Quinlan Rosner, Common Cause, Change Congress, Public Campaign
Action Fund, Frequency Questionnaire (Feb. 2-4, 2010), available at http://www.gqrr.com/
articles/2425/5606_cc10020410fq1.pdf.
181
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, N.Y.U. SCH. OF LAW, NATIONAL SURVEY: SUPER PACS,
CORRUPTION,
AND
DEMOCRACY
2
(Apr.
24,
2012),
available
at
http://www.democracy21.org/index.asp?Type=B_PR&SEC=%7BAC81D4FF-0476-4E28-B9
B1-7619D271A334%7D&DE=%7BE9D08E3E-2D85-4123-A7E2-920AF8015EA8%7D&
Design=PrintView; see also ABC News/Washington Post, Poll, available at http://
www.langerresearch.com/uploads/1135a3Super PACs.pdf.
182

See supra note 181.

183

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 882-83 (2010).

184

For Summaries of the Louisiana Campaign Finance Disclosure Act, La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 18:1481 et seq. (2013), see Campaign Finance Related Laws, LA. ETHICS ADMIN. PROGRAM,
http://ethics.la.gov/EthicsPublicationSearch.aspx?portal=CampFinLaws.
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supplies for schools throughout the state.185 AT&T Corp., which needed Governor
Jindal to sign off on legislation allowing the company to sell cable television
services without having to negotiate with individual parishes, has pledged at least
$250,000 dollars to the Supriya Jindal Foundation for Louisiana’s Children.
Marathon Oil, which won approval from the Jindal administration to increase the
amount of oil it could refine at its Louisiana plant, also committed to a $250,000
dollar donation.186 Northrop Grumman, a military contractor which got state
officials to help set up an airplane maintenance facility at a former Air Force base,
promised $10,000 dollars to the charity.187
It is important to note that none of these contributions were illegal and the
Governor has not been accused of any wrong-doing. However, political watch-dog
groups have condemned this type of behavior. Anne Rolfes, director of the
environmental group Louisiana Bucket Brigade, stated that the donations may be for
a good cause, but “it creates the appearance [Governor Jindal] is being bribed.”188
Melanie Sloan, director of Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics, stated that “the
donations that come in to charities like this are almost always from folks who want
something from a politician.”189
The Supreme Court in Citizens United upheld that rationale from Buckley that the
government has an “important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption.”190 Even though the Supreme Court has a very narrow
view of corruption,191 the empirical evidence provided in this Article meets that
threshold and the Supreme Court should have revisited Citizens United in light of
that evidence.
E. Independent Expenditures and the Independence of Super PACs
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court goes to great lengths to distinguish
independent expenditures and direct contributions to political candidates.
Independent political expenditures are defined as “an expenditure by a person
expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate which is
made without cooperation or consultation with any candidate, or any authorized
committee or agent of such candidate, and which is not made in concert with, or at
the request or suggestion of, any candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of
such candidate.”192

185

Eric Lipton, Wife’s Charity Offers Corporate Tie to a Governor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,

2011.
186

Id.

187

Id.

188

Id.

189

Id.

190

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 908 (2010).

191

Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497
(1985) (“The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political
favors.”).
192

2 U.S.C.A. § 431(17) (West 2002).
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The Supreme Court relied upon the decision in McConnell when stating that the
evidence did “‘not [show] any direct examples of votes being exchanged for . . .
expenditures.’”193 The Court further held that “the independent expenditure ceiling .
. . fails to serve any substantial governmental interest in stemming the reality or
appearance of corruption in the electoral process.”194 It is important to note that the
Supreme Court only quoted part of the language from McConnell. The Court in
McConnell went on to state that “the record presents an appearance of corruption
stemming from the dependence of officeholders and parties on advertisements run by
these outside groups.”195 The Court further stated that “[t]he record powerfully
demonstrates that electioneering communications paid for with the general treasury
funds of labor unions and corporations endears those entities to elected officials in a
way that could be perceived by the public as corrupting.196 This is an important
omission that, if included, would have changed the context of the Supreme Court’s
statement in Citizens United.
The Supreme Court believes that because independent expenditures do not
involve collusion between the party making the expenditure and the candidate, there
is no concern for corruption. “The absence of prearrangement and coordination . . .
alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper
commitments from the candidate.”197 This Article asserts that the Supreme Court’s
statement is untenable.
For example, the “Make Us Great Again” Super PAC, 198 which is a candidatespecific super PAC that supported the 2012 Presidential bid of Texas Governor Rick
Perry, was backed by Mike Toomey, who is a lobbyist who once served as Governor
Perry’s chief of staff.199 “Toomey also shares a business venture with a top Rick
Perry campaign aide. According to state records, Toomey is a co-owner of a New
Hampshire luxury resort island with Dave Carney, chief strategist for the Perry
campaign.”200 The “Restore Our Future” Super PAC, which is a candidate-specific
super PAC that supported the 2012 Presidential bid of former Massachusetts
Governor Mitt Romney, was backed by Carl Forti, who was the national political
director for Mitt Romney’s 2008 Presidential bid.201 The “Winning Our Future”
193
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910 (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540
U.S. 93, 560 (2003)).
194

Id. at 902 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1976) (per curiam)).

195

McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 560.

196

Id.

197

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 902 (quoting Buckley, 242 U.S. at 47).

198

Mission, MAKE US GREAT AGAIN, http://makeusgreatagain.com/mission/ (last visited
Mar. 4, 2013) (“The mission of Make Us Great Again is to support Rick Perry for the
Republican nomination for President in 2012, to oppose Barack Obama’s reelection, and to
support Rick Perry in the general election in November 2012.”).
199
Robert Farley, Make Us Great Again, FACTCHECK.ORG
http://www.factcheck.org/2011/10/make-us-great-again.
200

(Oct.

6,

2011),

Id.

201

Andy Kroll, Mitt Romney's $12 Million Mystery Man, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 2012),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/01/carl-forti-romney-super-PAC.
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Super PAC, which is a candidate-specific super PAC that supported the 2012
Presidential bid of Newt Gingrich, was backed by Rick Tyler, who is a former
Gingrich spokesman and aide.202
The “Priorities USA Action” Super PAC, which is a candidate-specific super
PAC that supported the 2012 Presidential bid of the incumbent United States
President Barack Obama, was backed by Bill Burton, who is a former White House
deputy press secretary.203 Billionaire Sheldon Adelson and his family, who donated
$16.5 million dollars to the “Winning Our Future” Super PAC, personally conferred
with Newt Gingrich at fundraisings events.204 Billionaire Foster Friess, who
bankrolled the “Red White and Blue Fund” Super PAC, which is a candidatespecific super PAC that supported the 2012 Presidential bid of Rick Santorum,
traveled with Santorum to campaign events.205
The political candidates themselves and high-ranking and campaign staffers can
also be seen at events hosted by these Super PACs, which further erodes the strength
of the Supreme Court’s argument that these organizations are independent and do
not collude with the candidates. In August 2011, Mitt Romney attended the first part
of a fundraising event for the “Restore Our Future” Super PAC.206 In March 2012,
David Plouffe, a top political adviser to President Obama, appeared at a fundraising
event for the “Priorities USA Action” Super PAC.207 These events show that the line
between political candidates and the super PACs that support them, and
subsequently independent expenditures and coordinated communications, are often
blurred.
For further evidence that these groups are not as independent as the Supreme
Court believes them to be, Mitt Romney’s Presidential campaign team and the
“Restore Our Future” Super PAC use the same consulting firm, TargetPoint
Consulting.208 To muddy the water even further, “in the same suite [of offices] is
WWP Strategies, whose co-founder is married to TargetPoint’s CEO and works for
the Romney campaign.”209 Mike Toomey, chief financial backer of the “Make Us
Great Again” Super PAC is a partner in The Texas Lobby Group, whose clients
202

Andy Kroll, Candidates and the Totally Unrelated Super-PACs That Love Them,
MOTHER JONES (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/01/stephen-colbertcitizens-united-super-pac.
203

Id.

204

Trevor Potter, Five Myths About Super PACs, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2012.

205

Id.

206
Nicholas Confessore, Lines Blur Between Candidates and PACs with Unlimited Cash,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2011.
207

Michael Luo & Nicholas Confessore, Top Obama Adviser to Appear at ‘Super PAC’
Meeting, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2012, 6:37 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/
2012/03/02/top-obama-adviser-to-appear-at-super-pac-meeting.
208

Mike McIntire & Michael Luo, Fine Line Between ‘Super PACs’ and Campaigns, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 25, 2012.
209

Id. (“Restore Our Future, for example, has paid TargetPoint Consulting nearly $350,000
for survey research. Meanwhile, the Romney campaign has paid TargetPoint nearly $200,000
for direct mail consulting. In one instance, the campaign and the super PAC paid TargetPoint
on the same day.”).
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include the drug company Merck Sharp & Dohme (Merck). In 2007, Governor
Perry issued an executive order requiring young girls to get a Merck-made vaccine
designed to prevent a sexually transmitted disease that can lead to cervical cancer.210
Under FEC regulations, the coordination rule’s “conduct” standards are also met by
use of a “common vendor” absent a firewall, or involvement of a person or
contractor who had been employed by the candidate in the previous 120 days, absent
a firewall.211
The political candidates themselves also contribute to blurring the lines of
independence. For example, the New York Times reported that in the summer of
2011, when discussing a large donation to the “Restore Our Future” Super PAC by
one of his former business partners, Mitt Romney characterized it as a donation to
himself.212 Based upon this evidence, when looking at the independence of these
groups, the Supreme Court would have had a hard time defending their earlier
position.
The Supreme Court should have also analyzed its own rationale from
McConnell.213 In McConnell, the Supreme Court relied on “the close relationship
between federal officeholders and the national parties” when upholding the federal
ban on soft money contributions.214 The Supreme Court also specifically found that
there was “no meaningful separation between the national party committees and the
public officials who control them,’ because the national committees were ‘run by,
and largely composed of, federal officeholders and candidates.’”215 The Supreme
Court should have analogized this situation to the close ties between candidates and
their respective super PACs. Based upon the evidence reported in this Article, it
should have been difficult for the Supreme Court to find that there was not at least
the appearance of corruption from the political candidate’s intimate, albeit indirect,
involvement with the super PAC organizations. The Supreme Court also did not
address the contention that “‘the absence of prearrangement and coordination’ does
not eliminate . . . ‘danger’ that a candidate will understand the expenditure as an
effort to obtain a quid pro quo. The same is true of independent party
expenditures.”216

210
Exec. Order of the Governor of the State of Tex., RP65—Relating to the Immunization
of Young Women from the Cancer-Causing Human Papilloma Virus (Feb. 2, 2007), available
at http://governor.state.tx.us/news/executive-order/3455.
211

See 11 C.F.R. §§ 109.21(d)(1)-(5) and 109.21(h) (2010).

212

Id.

213

McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).

214

Id. at 154.

215

Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 698 F. Supp. 2d 150, 159 (D.D.C.
2010) (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 155); see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 154-55 (“[I]t is
the close relationship between federal officeholders and the national parties, as well as the
means by which parties have traded on that relationship, that have made all large soft-money
contributions to national parties suspect.”).
216
Republican Party of Minn. v. Pauly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1015 (D. Minn. 1999)
(quoting Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604,
615-16 (1996)).
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F. Political Dark Money and 501(c)(4) Organizations
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in SpeechNow.org v. FEC217 and
EMILY'S List v. FEC218 established that PACs that sponsor independent campaign
advocacy can collect unlimited contributions from their supporters.219 Subsequently,
in July 2010, the FEC issued an Advisory Opinion stating that PACs “may solicit
and accept unlimited contributions from individuals, political committees,
corporations, and labor organizations.”220
The effect of these decisions and from the Citizens United decision has been the
rise in number of 501(c)(4) organizations, or social welfare organizations.221 Marcus
S. Owens, former head of the IRS division that oversees section 501(c)(4) groups,
was quoted as saying with regard to the new 501(c)(4)s being formed that the
“groups are popping up like mushrooms after a rain.”222 To give a better idea of the
amount of money spent by these groups, fifty-nine social welfare groups reported
spending more than $78.6 million dollars on political ads during the 2010 election
cycle, according to the Center for Responsive Politics.223 The Center for Responsive
Politics also reported that the percentage of spending coming from groups that do
not disclose their donors has risen from 1 percent to 47 percent since the 2006
midterm elections and that 501(c)(4) spending increased from zero percent of total
spending by outside groups in 2006 to 42 percent in 2010.224 The Center for
Responsive Politics recently compiled a report showing that as of June 20, 2012,
over $100 million dollars in contributions have been given to non-disclosing groups,
i.e., 501(c)(4) organizations.225
In order to be eligible for qualification as a social welfare organization, the
organization must promote the “common good and general welfare” of the

217

Speechnow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686 (2010).

218

EMILY’s List v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 581 F.3d 1 (2009).

219

FEC Approves Advisory Opinions for Independent Expenditure Committees, CTR.
EFFECTIVE GOV’T (Jul. 27, 2010), http://www.ombwatch.org/node/11164.

FOR

220
Fed. Election Comm’n Advisory Op. 2010-11 (“Commonsense Ten”) (proposed Jul. 22,
2010), available at http://www.fec.gov/agenda/2010/mtgdoc1042.pdf.
221

I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2006).

222
M. Luo & S. Strom, Donors’ Names Kept Secret as They Influence the Midterms, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2010.
223

Kim Barker et al., With the Spotlight on Super PACs, Here's How Donors are Really
Hiding Money, THE BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 4, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/withspotlight-on-super-pac-dollars-nonprofits-escape-scrutiny-2012-2.
224

Spencer MacColl, Citizens United Decision Profoundly Affects Political Landscape,
OPENSECRETS.ORG (May 5, 2011), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/05/citizens-uniteddecision-profoundly-affects-political-landscape.html.
225
See 2012 Outside Spending, by Groups, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.
org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&disp=O&type=U (last visited Mar. 4,
2013).
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community.226 It is important to note that Department of the Treasury regulations
specifically state that intervention in a political campaign is not considered
promotion of social welfare;227 however, social welfare organizations are “allowed to
intervene in political campaigns, but intervening in a political campaign must not be
their primary function.”228 It is also important to note that while the income of these
social welfare organizations is tax-exempt, donations to the organizations are not
deductible.229
A concern has been raised about how to define when a 501(c)(4) organization is
truly a social welfare organization whose primary purpose is to promote the common
good. In Vision Service Plan v. United States, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of California found that Vision Service Plan (VSP) was not a
social welfare organization and, therefore, did not qualify for tax-exempt status
under 501(c)(4).230 The district court found that while VSP offered some public
benefits, they were not enough for us to conclude that VSP was primarily engaged in
promoting the common good and general welfare of the community.231 In a recent
case out of the Fourth Circuit, the court upheld the FEC’s approach to determining
whether an organization is a PAC.232 In Real Truth About Abortion v. FEC, the court
held that the FEC will first consider a group's political activities, such as spending on
a particular electoral or issue-advocacy campaign and then it will evaluate an
organization's "major purpose," as revealed by that group's public statements,
fundraising appeals, government filings, and organizational documents.233 This will
be an issue that will come up with many organizations who want to keep the
identities of their donors secret, but also be able to contribute to political campaigns.
226
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (1960) (“An organization embraced within this
section is one which is operated primarily for the purpose of bringing about civic betterments
and social improvements”).
227

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (1960) (“The promotion of social welfare does not
include direct or indirect participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in
opposition to any candidate for public office”); see also Rev. Rul. 67-368, 1967-2 C.B. 194
(An organization, “formed for the purpose of promoting an enlightened electorate,” whose
primary activity was rating candidates for public office, was not exempt under I.R.C.
501(c)(4) because such activity is not “the promotion of social welfare.”).
228

Donald B. Tobin, Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities: Are They the Next
‘Loophole’? (Mortiz Coll. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No.
105, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1020421 (citing I.R.C. § 527(f)) (emphasis
added).
229

Id.

230

See Vision Serv. Plan v. United States, No. Civ. S-04-1993 LKK/JFM, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 38812 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2005), aff’d, 265 F. App’x 650 (9th Cir. 2008).
231
Id. at *13-14; see also Monterey Pub. Parking Corp. v. United States, 481 F.2d 175, 177
(9th Cir. 1973) (noting that the district court made a quantitative comparison between the
private and public benefits); Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Lake Forest, Inc., 305 F.2d 814,
818 (4th Cir. 1962) (noting that the public benefits of organization were too insubstantial to
qualify the organization as exempt under section 501(c)(4)).
232

See Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 681 F.3d 544, 555 (4th
Cir. 2012) (citing Political Comm. Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 5595, 5596-97 (Feb. 7, 2007)).
233

Id. at 555 (citing Political Comm. Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 5595, 5596-97 (Feb. 7, 2007)).
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This practice has received greater scrutiny since the Supreme Court’s decision in
Citizens United. In January 2012, the IRS sent out letters to certain 501(c)(4)
organizations, who are politically active to determine whether they are “primarily”
engaged in social welfare and not political campaigning.234 If these organizations are
found to not qualify for 501(c)(4) status, they could face severe penalties including
fines and/or imprisonment.235 The 501(c)(4) organizations have retained counsel to
fight the IRS inquiry, so this issue may stay undecided for some time.
The IRS also recently revoked the tax-exempt status of a small political nonprofit
organization, “Emerge America.”236 “Emerge America” was founded for the
primary purpose of identifying and training democratic women to run for office, get
elected and to seek higher office.237 The March 2012 IRS letter stated that “Emerge
America” was not being operated primarily to promote social welfare because its
activities were conducted primarily for the benefit of a political party and a private
group of individuals, rather than the community as a whole.238
A recent example of a 501(c)(4) organization that has raised red flags for the IRS
is the recently created “Patriot Voices,” a group formed by ex-Presidential candidate
Rick Santorum. As noted above, to qualify as a social welfare organization,
intervening in a political campaign must not be the organization’s primary
function.”239 However, when announcing the creation of “Patriot Voices” in early
June, Rick Santorum stated that “the defeat of Barack Obama, and those who support
his policies, will be our first priority.”240 The IRS has not taken action as of the date
of this Article, but multiple tax experts have opined that “Patriot Voices” will be
under intense IRS scrutiny in the near future.241
Another issue that arises with these organizations is unlike other political
advocacy groups, such as PACs, they are not required to disclose their donors.242
This has led many super PACs to form sister 501(c)(4) organizations. For example,
the super PAC “American Crossroads” has a sister 501(c)(4) organization named
234
Jonathan Weisman, Scrutiny of Political Nonprofits Sets Off Claim of Harassment, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2012. An example of the letter is available at http://www.documentcloud
.org/documents/323502-letter-from-the-irs-to-tea-party-organizatio ns.html.
235

See I.R.C. § 7201 (Proposed Amendment 2011).

236

Jonathan D. Salant, IRS Denial of Tax Exemption to U.S. Political Group Spurs Alarms,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 8, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-08/irs-denialof-tax-exemption-to-u-s-political-group-spurs-alarms.html.
237
About Emerge, EMERGE AMERICA, http://www.emergeamerica.org/about (last visited
Mar. 4, 2013).
238

I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2012-21-028
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/1221028.pdf.
239

(Mar.

2,

2012),

available

at

Tobin, supra note 228.

240

Andy Kroll, Is Rick Santorum's New Dark-Money Group Breaking the Law?, MOTHER
JONES (July 3, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/07/rick-santorum-patriotvoices-dark-money-irs.
241

Id.

242

See Alex Trepp, 501(See)(4)s Leave Public Blind, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (Oct. 6,
2011), http://harvardcrcl.org/2011/10/06/501see4s-leave-public-blind/.
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“Crossroads Grass Roots Policy Strategies (GPS).” The super PAC “Priorities USA
Action” has a sister 501(c)(4) organization named Priorities USA” that had
contributed over $215,000 dollars to the super PAC.243 The super PAC “Freedom
Works for America,” shares an office and staff with its sister 501(c)(4) organization
named “Freedom Works, Inc.”244
For donors that want to maintain anonymity, they can simply donate to the
501(c)(4) organization, who does not have to report its donors, who will then
contribute those funds to the affiliated super PAC.245 When the super PAC files its
contribution report with the FEC, it will only reflect the 501(c)(4) contribution. A
strong argument can be made that this type of activity harms the American people’s
right to transparency regarding the financing of federal elections, which was held to
be of paramount importance in Citizens United.246
G. Shell Corporations and Circumventing Disclosure and Tax Laws
This Article asserts that individuals are circumventing disclosure and tax laws by
creating shell corporations specifically set up for the sole purpose of contributing
money to a PAC. This practice violates the goal of transparency in the political
system. As the Supreme Court wrote in Citizens United, “transparency enables the
electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers
and messages.”247 The Court also wrote that campaign finance disclosure laws “help
citizens make informed choices in the political marketplace.”248
In August 2011, the Campaign Legal Center249 and Democracy 21250 filed a
complaint with the FEC based upon a $1 million dollar contribution to the “Restore
Our Future” Super PAC.251 The complaint alleges that W Spann LLC and any
243

Michael Beckel & Rachel Marcus, Donors to Conservative Super PAC Masked by
Nonprofit, NATION OF CHANGE (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.nationofchange.org/donorsconservative-super-pac-masked-nonprofit-1331561155.
244

Id.

245

See Letter from Gerald Herbert, Exec. Dir., Campaign Legal Ctr. & Fred Wertheimer,
President, Democracy 21, to Hon. Douglas H. Shulman, Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv. &
Lois Lerner, Dir. of the Exempt Org. Div., Internal Revenue Serv. (Oct. 5, 2010), available at
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/blogs/thecaucus/05IRSLETTER.pdf (requesting that the
IRS investigate Crossroads GPS for operating in violation of tax status).
246

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010).

247

Id. at 916.

248

Id. at 914.

249

Mission Statement, THE CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., http://www.campaignlegalcenter
.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=50&Itemid=64 (last visited Mar. 4,
2012) (“The Campaign Legal Center is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization which works in
the areas of campaign finance and elections, political communication and government
ethics.”).
250
Our Mission, DEMOCRACY 21, http://www.democracy21.org/our-mission/ (last visited
Mar. 4, 2012) (“Democracy 21 is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization dedicated to making
democracy work for all Americans.”).
251
See Complaint Before the U.S. Fed. Election Comm’n, Campaign Legal Ctr. &
Democracy 21 v. W Spann LLC. [hereinafter Spann FEC Complaint], available at http://
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person who created, operated and made contributions in the name of W Spann LLC
may have violated the provisions of the Federal Election Commission Act
(FECA).252 After the complaint was filed, the person who created W Spann LLC
came forward, therefore I will use the individual’s name, Edward Conard, instead of
the generic “John Doe” listed in the complaint.253
As background information, W Spann LLC’s “corporate records provide no
information about the owner of the firm, its address or its type of business.”254 The
address included on “Restore Our Future’s” mid-year report for W Spann LLC is “a
midtown Manhattan office building that has no record of such a tenant.”255 Records
reflect that W Spann LLC was created on March 15, 2011, when a “certificate of
formation” was filed with the Delaware Secretary of State’s Office.256 The
complaint also alleges that W Spann LLC made a $1 million contribution to
“Restore Our Future” Super PAC on April 28, 2011 and then filed a “certificate of
cancellation” on July 11, effectively dissolving as a corporate entity.257
The complaint alleges that Edward Conard violated federal law by making an
individual contribution though a shell company, W Spann LLC. The complainant
alleges that this action violates federal election regulations by “[m]aking a
contribution of money or anything of value and attributing as the source of the
money or thing of value another person when in fact the contributor is the source.”258
The complaint also alleges that W Spann LLC should have filed as a “political
committee” with the FEC.259 Political committee, under the FECA, is defined as
“any committee, club, association or other group of persons which receives
contributions aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year or which makes
expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year.”260 The
complainants allege that W Spann LLC “met the . . . test for political committee
status by (1) being an entity or group of persons with the ‘major purpose’ of

www.campaignlegalcenter.org/attachments/W_Spann_LLC_FEC_Complaint_Signed_and_N
otarized_8.5.11.pdf; see also Michael Isikoff, Firm Gives $1 Million to Pro-Romney Group,
then Dissolves, NBC NEWS (Aug. 4, 2011), http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/44011308/
ns/politics-decision_2012. The Campaign Legal Center also requested the Justice Department
to pursue criminal charges; however, there is no evidence that criminal charges were filed.
252

See Spann FEC Complaint, supra note 251, ¶ 1.

253

Paul S. Ryan, Some Questions for Mitt Romney and Edward Conard, THE HILL (Aug.
20, 2011), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/campaign/176305-some-questions-for-mittromney-and-edward-conard.
254

See Spann FEC Complaint, supra note 251, ¶ 7 (quoting Isikoff, supra note 251).

255

Id. (quoting Isikoff, supra note 251).

256

Id. ¶ 8.

257

Id.

258

Id. ¶ 12 (quoting 11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b)(2)(ii)).

259

Id. ¶ 22; see also 2 U.S.C.A. § 433 (West 2011) (political committee filing
requirements).
260

2 U.S.C.A. § 431(4) (West 2002).
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influencing the ‘nomination or election of a candidate’ and (2) by receiving
‘contributions’ of $1,000 or more in a calendar year.”261
The Campaign Legal Center has also filed complaints against Steven J. Lund, Eli
Publishing, LC, and F8, LLC, for two separate contributions of $1 million dollars
each made to the “Restore Our Future” Super PAC.262 Both companies, Eli
Publishing and F8, share an address in Utah.263 News reports showed that the
companies did not seem to do any real business and when the news reporter went to
the address listed in the official filings, there was an accounting firm whose
employees were not aware of those activities.264 Steven J. Lund, the registered agent
for Eli Publishing, claimed that he used the corporation to make the contribution,
because donating through a corporation has accounting advantages.265
In May 2011, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW)
called for the IRS and the FEC to investigate whether the 501(C)(4) organization
Commission on Hope, Growth and Opportunity (CHGO) violated tax and campaign
finance laws.266 The complaint alleged that even though CHGO represented that it
had not and would not spend any money on influencing political elections, Scott
Reed, the organization’s founder,267 stated that the organization planned to raise $25
million dollars to air political advertisements in 2012.268 In 2010, CHGO received
over $4 million dollars from one donor, Meridian Strategies, LLC.269
The complaint also alleged specific instances where CHGO has spent money for
advertisements advocating the defeat of a political candidate.270 The complaint

261

See Spann FEC Complaint, supra note 251, ¶ 22.

262

See Fed. Election Comm’n Complaints, Campaign Legal Ctr. & Democracy 21 v.
Steven J. Lund & Eli Publ’g, LC & Campaign Legal Ctr. & Democracy 21 v. Steven J. Lund
& F8, LLC [hereinafter Lund FEC Complaint].
263

Lund FEC Complaint, supra note 262, ¶ 6 (citing Utah Government Division of
Corporations and Commercial Code website database).
264

Id. ¶ 9 (citing Max Roth, 2 Utah Companies Donate $1 million Apiece to Romney PAC,
FOX 13 NEWS (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.fox13now.com/news/local/kstu-mitt-romney-2utah-companiesdonate-1-million-apiece-to-romney-campaign-20110804,0,4424937.story).
265

Id. ¶ 10 (citing Roth, supra note 264).

266

CREW Renews Call for IRS, FEC to Investigate the Commission on Hope, Growth and
Opportunity, CITIZENSFORETHICS.ORG (May 23, 2011), http://www.citizensforethics.org/legalfilings/entry/irs-fec-complaints-commission-hope-growth-opportunity.
267
Brody Mullins & Danny Yadron, GOP Groups Launch Massive Ad Blitz, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 13, 2010.
268

Letter from Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., to Internal Revenue Serv. 3-4
(May 23, 2011), available at http://crew.3cdn.net/2258532ac243e4ed58_32m6vthuy.pdf.
Exhibits to the May 2012 IRS Letter are available at http://crew.3cdn.net/cb453
82703b3ca4e0b_0hm6i0lpa.pdf.
269

CHGO 2010 Form 990, Schedule B, available at http://crew.3cdn.net/7b7d3553ee575
4bca4_ kim6b0s9j.pdf.
270

Letter, supra note 268, at 6.
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relied upon data from the Campaign Media Analysis Group (CMAG),271 which
showed that CHGO spent $2.3 million dollars on campaign advertisements from
September 25, 2010 to November 1, 2010.272 The complaint further alleged that
CHGO not only failed to report its spending to the FEC, it also failed to disclose it to
the IRS. CHGO asserted under penalty of perjury on its 2010 and 2011 tax returns it
did not spend any money on political activities in either year.273 CREW contended
that because the advertisements attacked Democratic candidates and advocated the
election of Republican candidates, they went beyond mere issue advocacy and were
political activity.274 CREW also calculated CHGO spent at least 51.5 percent of its
total spending in 2010 producing and broadcasting the advertisements, making
politics its primary activity in violation of its tax-exempt status.275 Because CHGO
reported to the IRS, under penalty of perjury,276 that the organization did not spend
any money on political adverting, those advertisements would be fraudulent speech,
which as discussed below, does not receive First Amendment protection.
These contributions show that not only are individuals gaining anonymity from
creating shell corporations for the sole purpose of contributing to super PACs, they
are also gaining tax advantages and possibly committing tax fraud. The Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence reflects that fraudulent statements and statements and speech
integral to criminal conduct, which in this case would be political expenditures from
a shell corporation made for the express purpose of circumventing tax laws, do not
receive First Amendment protection.277 In Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the Court
held that fraudulent speech generally falls outside the protections of the First
Amendment.278 In Giboney v. Empire Storage, the Court held that the First
Amendment does not immunize speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct
in violation of a valid criminal statute.279
The Supreme Court erred by not analyzing the government’s compelling interest
in stopping tax fraud. Because the assertions made to the IRS are under oath of
perjury, they are not mere statements of falsehood. The Supreme Court has
271
“Campaign Media Analysis Group, a Kantar Media solution, is the exclusive source of
. . . content analysis [and advertising expenditure data] for political, public affairs and issue
advocacy [professionals].” KANTAR MEDIA, http://www.kantarmediana.com/cmag/expertise.
272

Letter, supra note 268, at 3-4.

273

CHGO 2010 Form 990, pt. IV, ln. 3; CHGO 2011 Form 990, pt. IV, ln. 3, available at
http://crew.3cdn.net/8ba93bf54d3a54b31b_yrm6bqld7.pdf.
274

Letter, supra note 268, at 5.

275

Id.

276

Failure to include required information on a tax return can make a tax-exempt entity
liable for civil penalties, 26 U.S.C. § 6652(c)(1)(A)(ii), 6652(c)(4) (2006); Internal Revenue
Serv., Instructions for Form 990 at 6-7 (2011), and willfully submitting a false tax return
under penalty of perjury is a felony that can be punished by up to three years in prison and a
fine of $100,000. 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (2006).
277

See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976); see Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490 (1949).
278

Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771.

279

Giboney, 336 U.S. at 498.
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consistently upheld the constitutionality of perjury statutes.280 The Court has found
that to “uphold the integrity of our trial system . . . the constitutionality of perjury
statutes is unquestioned.”281 Even though the Supreme Court recently held that lying
about your military service decorations is protected by the First Amendment,282 it did
upheld the constitutionality of criminalizing perjured statements by finding that
“perjured testimony ‘is at war with justice’ because it can cause a court to

render a ‘judgment not resting on truth.’”283

Another issue that arises from these shell corporations is the ability of foreign
citizens to flood the U.S. political system with foreign money. In Bluman v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, which will be discussed in greater detail later in this Article, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia relied on Supreme Court
jurisprudence when holding that “[t]he government may exclude foreign citizens
from activities ‘intimately related to the process of democratic self-government.’”284
According to Trevor Potter, former chairman of the FEC, it is “more difficult to
enforce the ban on foreign spending when the source of the money is not publicly
disclosed.”285
There is empirical evidence that this practice is widespread and has been
occurring for many years. In 1992, John Huang, an employee of Lippo Group286 and
a long-time friend of then Presidential candidate Bill Clinton, began to raise illegal
foreign money for the Democratic National Committee (DNC) through Lippo Group
owned shell companies; these contributions were reimbursed with funds from Lippo
Group's headquarters in Jakarta, Indonesia.287 In 1994, Haley Barbour, who was
chairman of the Republican National Committee (RNC), persuaded a Hong Kong
businessman, Ambrous Young, to post collateral of $2 million dollars in support of a
loan to the National Policy Forum, which was a think tank presided over by Barbour,
and a de facto subsidiary of the RNC.288 The collateral was posted by a shell
corporation that had no assets other than money transferred from Hong Kong.289 In
1997, the DNC returned a $250,000 dollar contribution from a recently established
U.S. subsidiary of a South Korean electronics company because it violated a ban on
donations from foreign nationals.290
280

United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 54 (1978) (“unquestioned constitutionality of
perjury statutes”); see also Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U. S. 36, 51 n.10 (1961).
281

United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 97 (1993).

282

See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).

283

Id. at 2546 (quoting In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945)).

284

Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 287 (2011) (quoting Bernal v.
Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 (1984)).
285
Stephen Braun, Super PAC Foreign Donations a Risk in 2012 Presidential Election,
HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 10, 2012.
286

Lippo Group is an Indonesian industrial conglomerate.

287

S. REP. NO. 105-167 (1998).

288

Id.

289

Id.

290

H.R. REP. NO. 105-829 (1998). The report details a $250,000 dollar contribution from a
subsidiary of a South Korean company, Cheong Am America Inc. The DNC acknowledged
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Other examples include CITGO Petroleum Company, once the American-born
Cities Services Company, but purchased in 1990 by the Venezuelan governmentowned Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. could allow Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez, who has sharply criticized both of the past two U.S. presidents, to spend
government funds to defeat an American political candidate, just by having CITGO
buy TV ads.291 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a trade association organized as a
501(c)(6) that can raise and spend unlimited funds without ever disclosing any of its
donors, operates foreign chapters of the Chamber in places abroad (which are known
as "AmChams") which pay yearly dues to the U.S. Chamber; however, a
spokeswoman for the Chamber stated that the AmChams are independent
organizations and they do not fund political programs in the United States.292
This evidence reinforces the dangers of allowing corporations to spend unlimited
amounts of money in political campaigns. It also reflects the danger of organizations
to accept unlimited amounts of money without disclosing the source of the funds.
The Supreme Court even agreed with this rationale in Citizens United when it stated
“that independent groups were running election related advertisements while hiding
behind dubious and misleading names”293
However, even with empirical evidence reflecting that this practice is
widespread, the Supreme Court refused to revisit their holding in Citizens United.
V. WHY THE COURT SHOULD HAVE REVISITED CITIZENS UNITED
The Montana Court argued that because of Montana’s “unique” history and
circumstances, the Montana Statute was distinguishable from the BCRA and,
therefore, constitutional. As noted above, the Supreme Court recently granted
certiorari and summarily reversed the Montana Supreme Court’s decision in Western
Tradition Partnership294 This part provides additional arguments to strengthen the
argument that Citizens United should have been limited or overturned. These
arguments include: the breadth of the First Amendment, the ability of PACs to speak
for corporations, “foreign” corporations and the governmental power to regulate
elections, shareholder protection, the treatment of public unions, and the Supreme
Court’s history of altering constitutional doctrine when its understanding of the
doctrine’s factual underpinnings are no longer accurate.

that it did not return the contribution until the Los Angeles Times raised questions about its
propriety.
291

Mike Lillis, Supreme Court Empowers Foreign Governments to Sway Federal
Elections?, WASH INDEP., Jan. 22, 2010, available at http://washingtonindependent.com/7460
0/supreme-court-empowers-foreign-governments-to-sway-federal-elections.
292
Brian Montopoli, Chamber of Commerce Denies Foreign Money Funding Campaign
Ads, CBS NEWS (Oct. 5, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20018631503544.html.
293

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010).

294

Am. Tradition P'ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).
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A. Breadth of the First Amendment
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court discussed multiple cases where
corporations are afforded First Amendment protection.295 The Court, citing to
NAACP v. Button296 and Grosjean v. American Press Co.,297 held that First
Amendment “protection has been extended [to corporations] by explicit holdings to
the context of political speech.”298 The Court also cited Austin when stating that
“[s]tate law grants corporations special advantages—such as limited liability,
perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of
assets.”299
It is important to note that the Supreme Court, before Citizens United, never
stated that corporations receive the same treatment under the First Amendment that
individuals do. In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Com., the Supreme
Court stated that “[t]he identity of the speaker is not decisive in determining whether
speech is protected. Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute
to the ‘discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas" that the
First Amendment seeks to foster.’”300 In California Medical Association v. FEC, the
Supreme Court held that “‘differing structures and purposes’ of corporations and
unions ‘may require different forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity of
the electoral process.’”301 In FEC v. National Right to Work, the Supreme Court
held that “‘the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly
careful regulation’” in an electoral context.302 Throughout the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence, the Court has strived to fashion a balance between the integrity of the
electoral process and the freedom of speech provided by the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court also relies heavily on Bellotti to show that restrictions
distinguishing among different speakers, specifically allowing speech by some but
not others, is not permitted and that “political speech does not lose First Amendment
protection ‘simply because its source is a corporation.’”303 The Supreme Court’s
discussion of Bellotti is somewhat misleading. In Bellotti, the Court struck down a

295

See, e.g., Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Time, Inc.
v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975);
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469 (1975); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); N.Y. Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374
(1967); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
296

Nat’l Assoc. for the Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963).
297

Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936).

298

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900.

299

Id. at 905 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)).

300

Pac. Gas & Electric Co. v. Pub Utilities Co., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (citing First Nat’l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).
301

Cal. Med. Ass’n. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 201 (1981).

302

Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209-10 (1982).

303

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784).
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law that distinguished between a corporation whose business was materially affected
by a referendum and one whose business was not.304
It is important to note that Bellotti does not make any effort to distinguish
expenditures by individuals and expenditures by corporations. Interestingly, the
Court in Citizens United specifically stated that the “Bellotti did not address the
constitutionality of the State’s ban on corporate independent expenditures to support
candidates.”305 It is also important to note that Bellotti involved expenditures on a
referendum, not expenditures directed to a specific candidate. The Court in Bellotti
specifically stated that “‘[r]eferenda are held on issues, not candidates for public
office. The risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate elections . . .
simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue.’”306 This language suggests
that the Supreme Court believed that corporate expenditures supporting or opposing
a candidate could present a risk of corruption.
The majority in Citizens United also goes to great lengths to emphasize that “the
Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate
identity.”307 The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, as noted by the dissent in Citizens
United, reflects that the Court has regulated speech differently based upon a
speaker’s identity.308 “It is clear that [neither] the right to associate nor the right to
participate in political activities is absolute.”309
In Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, the Supreme Court held that “the
constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive
with the rights of adults in other settings.”310 The Court specifically found that the
“‘fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system’
disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive or highly threatening to others.
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of
expression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions.”311
In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., the Supreme Court held
that “[i]n a prison context, an inmate does not retain those First Amendment rights
that are ‘inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological
objectives of the corrections system.’”312 The Court further held that:
304
Alexander Polikoff, So How Did We Get Into This Mess? Observations on the
Legitimacy of Citizens United, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 203, 216 (2011).
305

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903.

306

Polikoff, supra note 304, at 215 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790).

307

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.

308

Id. at 945 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting in part and
concurring in part) (“The Government routinely places special restrictions on the speech rights
of students, prisoners, members of the Armed Forces, foreigners, and its own employees.”).
309
Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207 (1982)
(quoting Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973)).
310

Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).

311

Id. at 683. “In Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 . . . (1979), we echoed the
essence of this statement of the objectives of public education as the ‘inculcate[ion of]
fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.’” Id. at
681.
312

Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977).
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[i]n banning Union solicitation or organization, appellants have merely
affected one of several ways in which inmates may voice their complaints
to, and seek relief, from prison officials. There exists an inmate grievance
procedure through which correctional officials are informed about
complaints concerning prison conditions, and through which remedial
action may be secured. With this presumably effective path available for
the transmission of grievances, the fact that the Union's grievance
procedures might be more “desirable” does not convert the prohibitory
regulations into unconstitutional acts.313
In Parker v. Levy, the Supreme Court held that “[w]hile the members of the
military are not excluded from the protection granted by the First Amendment, the
different character of the military community and of the military mission requires a
different application of those protections.”314 The Court further held that “[s]peech
that is protected in the civil population may nonetheless undermine the effectiveness
of response to command. If it does, it is constitutionally unprotected.”315
The Supreme Court has also placed limits on the political speech of federal
employees. In Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, the Supreme Court held
that:
The government has an interest in regulating the conduct and “the speech
of its employees that differ[s] significantly from those it possesses in
connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. The
problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the
[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern
and the interest of the [government], as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”316
The majority in Citizens United held that these decisions upheld a narrow class of
speech restrictions operating to the disadvantage of certain persons because the
“rulings were based on an interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their
functions.”317 However, one could argue that a political system fraught with
corruption or even the appearance of corruption would impede the government from
allowing the democratic process to function the way it was intended. The dissent
made a strong argument that “Congress and half the state legislatures have
concluded, over many decades, that their core functions of administering elections
and passing legislation cannot operate effectively without some narrow restrictions
on corporate electioneering paid for by general treasury funds.”318

313

Id. at 131 n.6.

314

Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974).

315

Id. at 759.

316

Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973).

317

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010).

318

Id. at 946 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting in part and
concurring in part).
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B. PACs Can Speak for Companies
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court held that “[a] PAC is a separate
association from the corporation . . . the PAC exemption from the [law’s]
expenditure ban does not allow corporations to speak.”319 The Montana Court
distinguished PACs in Montana, stating that unlike the federal rules for PACs,
Montana law reflects that PACs can “be formed and maintained by filing simple and
straight-forward forms or reports.”320
This Article posits that PACs do have the ability to speak for corporations. In
FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., the Supreme Court held that PACs permit “some
participation of unions and corporations in the federal electoral process by allowing
them to establish and pay the administrative expenses of "separate segregated
[funds]," which may be "utilized for political purposes."321 In FEC v. Beaumont, the
Supreme Court held that PACs “allow[] corporate political participation without the
temptation to use corporate funds for political influence, quite possibly at odds with
the sentiments of some shareholders or members, and it lets the government regulate
campaign activity through registration and disclosure.”322 It is important to note that
neither of these cases was overruled by Citizens United.323
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence reflects a line of cases that found PACs to be
a sufficient vehicle for corporate speech. By ignoring their own jurisprudence, the
Court in Citizens United stated that “[a] PAC is a separate association from the
corporation.”324 It is instructive to look at the construction of a PAC and analyze this
claim. Federal election law refers to “a corporate or labor political committee as a
‘separate segregated fund’ (SSF), though it is more commonly called a PAC.”325
“As the name implies, money contributed to a [PAC] is held in a separate bank
account from the general corporate or union treasury.”326 This structure seems to
support the Court’s statements in Citizens United concerning the “separate” nature of
PACs.
However, a corporation or union that sponsors a PAC is called the connected
organization.327 The connected organization may use its general treasury funds to
pay for the costs of operating and raising money for the PAC. These costs include:
office space, phones, salaries, utilities, supplies, bank charges and fundraising

319

Id. at 897.

320

W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 20 (Mont. 2011).

321

Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 201 (1982).

322

Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 163 (2003).

323

The majority in Citizens United discussed these cases, but did not specifically overrule
either of the decisions.
324

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897.

325
FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION CAMPAIGN GUIDE:
CORPORATIONS AND LABOR ORGANIZATIONS (Jan. 2007), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/
colagui.pdf.
326

Id. at ii.

327

Id.
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activities.328 Contributions may be solicited from the corporation’s executive and
administrative personnel and stockholders and also the families of these two
groups.329 Stockholders include employees of the corporation who participate in an
employee stock ownership plan (ESOP), such as a 401(k).330 Because corporations
are made up of and managed by individuals, and those same individuals have the
ability to contribute to political campaigns through a corporation’s PAC, this is
evidence that corporations do have the ability to speak through their respective
PACs.
C. “Foreign” Corporations and Governmental Power to Regulate Elections
The BCRA provides that it is unlawful for a foreign national to make a
contribution or independent expenditure in a federal, state, or local election.331 A
foreign national includes corporations and organizations formed under the laws of or
having its principal place of business in a foreign country.332 In Citizens United, the
Supreme Court specifically stated that they “need not reach the question whether the
Government has a compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or
associations from influencing our Nation's political process.”333 Because the
Supreme Court did not rule on this issue many questions still exist such as how to
treat corporations in the United States whose majority shareholders are foreign
nationals and how to treat corporations that are incorporated in the United States, but
have their principal place of business outside the United States.
The seminal case discussing the First Amendment rights of foreign nationals in
political elections is Bluman v. FEC.334 In Bluman, Canadian citizens, who were
temporarily living and working in the U.S., argued to the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia that the federal ban on their ability to contribute to U.S.
political elections was unconstitutional.335 The court denied the plaintiffs’ claims
and found that the government could exclude foreign citizens from activities that
were part of democratic self-government in the United States and that the limitations
on the activities of foreign citizens were part of the sovereign's obligation to preserve
the basic conception of a political community.336
The D.C. District Court relied on the Supreme Court’s holding that “[t]he
government may exclude foreign citizens from activities ‘intimately related to the
process of democratic self-government.’”337 The D.C. District Court further held
that because foreign nationals are by definition outside of the U.S. political
328
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community, they were not entitled to influence the political process.338 In regard to
foreign corporations, the Court stated that foreign corporations are also barred from
making contributions and expenditures in U.S political elections.339
Based upon the discussion above, courts have clearly stated that the government
has a compelling interest in excluding foreign corporations from participating in the
U.S. political process. This Article proposes that the Supreme Court should have
revisited Citizens United in light of the empirical evidence showing foreign influence
in U.S. politics and the rationale from Bluman and grant states the power to exclude
all corporations that are not incorporated in that particular state or have their
principal place of business in that state. A “foreign” corporation in regard to a state
is different than a “foreign” corporation in regard to the U.S. as a whole. For
example, the Texas Secretary of State website states that “[i]f an organization was
formed under, and the internal affairs are governed by, the laws of a jurisdiction
other than Texas, the organization is a “foreign entity.”340 The Vermont Secretary of
State website states that “[a]n out-of-state ("foreign") corporation must procure a
certificate of authority from our office in order to do business legally in Vermont.”341
All states have the same or similar requirements and definitions.
States should argue that they have the same concern as the U.S. in excluding
foreign corporations from activities that are part of democratic self-government in
their respective state. A critical distinction that can be made is that while persons
can be citizens of a state and the U.S. at the same time, corporations are artificial
creations of the state. The Supreme Court has stated on multiple occasions that
corporations are creatures of state law and that it is state law which grants corporate
directors' powers.342 Based upon the current case law, states should argue that they
have the same compelling interest preserving the basic conception of a political
community in their respective state.
The June 2012 Wisconsin Gubernatorial Recall Election is a good example of out
of state corporations influencing state political elections. According to an analysis
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by the Wisconsin Democracy Campaign,343 approximately 60 percent of the money
raised by current Governor Scott Walker came from outside Wisconsin.344 Even
though it is difficult to accurately track these numbers because of the lack of
transparency from corporations concerning their donors, as an idea of the money
flowing from out of state donors, Governor Walker raised $13 million dollars in the
first three months of 2012 alone.345
The Supreme Court has long held that states are permitted to regulate in-state
components of interstate transactions so long as the regulation furthers legitimate instate interests.346 In Bigelow v. Virginia, Justice Rehnquist wrote in his dissenting
opinion that the Supreme Court had “consistently recognized that irrespective of a
State’s power to regulate extraterritorial commercial transactions in which its
citizens participate it retains an independent power to regulate the business of
commercial solicitation and advertising within its borders.”347
The Supreme Court also has a long history of permitting the legislature,
especially at the state and local levels, to regulate elections. In Burroughs v. United
States, the Supreme Court held that Congress possessed the power “to pass
appropriate legislation to safeguard [the election of the President and Vice-President]
from the improper use of money to influence the result . . . as it possesses every
other power essential to preserve the departments and institutions of the general
government from impairment or destruction, whether threatened by force or by
corruption.”348 In United States v. Harriss, the Supreme Court held that Congress
could legislate to obtain “information from those who for hire attempt to influence
legislation or who collect or spend funds for that purpose” to determine “who is
being hired, who is putting up the money, and how much.”349 In Ex Parte
Yarbrough, the Supreme Court held that states “must have the power to protect the
elections on which its existence depends from violence and corruption.”350
The Supreme Court has even stated that “the Framers of the Constitution
intended the States to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, the
power to regulate elections,”351 and that “[s]tates [have] significant flexibility in
343
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implementing their own voting systems.”352 The Supreme Court completely ignored
not only the amount of empirical data reflecting the power of corporations and
organizations to anonymously affect political processes, but also its own long history
of granting states the ability to regulate state and local elections.
D. Shareholder Protection
The Supreme Court also dismissed the shareholder protection argument raised in
Citizens United. The Court wrote that there was little evidence of abuse that could
not be corrected by shareholders “‘through the procedures of corporate
democracy.’”353 However, the Supreme Court does not provide any evidence to
support this claim, they only make the assertion and then move to the next issue.
Based upon the current state of securities laws, there is empirical evidence reflecting
that shareholders do not hold the power proscribed to them by the Court in Citizens
United.
The first issue that arises is the transparency of political expenditures and
contributions. Corporate managers can spend corporate money on politics without
notifying shareholders and do not need authorization from shareholders.354 An
October 2010 study conducted by Sustainable Investments Institute (SSI) and the
Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute (IRRC) found that very few
companies mention independent political expenditures in their stated policies.355
The second issue is even if the shareholders are aware of a corporation’s political
spending, they do not have the authority to stop the transaction. Under corporate

352
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law, shareholders must allege corruption or reckless conduct in order to even state a
claim challenging management actions.356 This is not an easy burden to meet.357
E. Treatment of Public Unions
It is instructive to look at Supreme Court decisions which have favored the First
Amendment rights of public employees. The Supreme Court has limited public
unions with respect to political expenditures. In International Association of
Machinists v. Street, Justice Douglas wrote in his concurring opinion that the “use of
union funds for political purposes subordinates the individual's First Amendment
rights to the views of the majority.”358 In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the
Supreme Court found that a public-sector union can bill nonmembers for chargeable
expenses, but may not require them to fund its political projects.359 The Court
specifically held that “a government may not require an individual to relinquish
rights guaranteed him by the First Amendment as a condition of public
employment.”360 In United States v. United Foods, the Supreme Court stated that
“First Amendment values [would be] at serious risk if the government [could]
compel a particular citizen, or a discrete group of citizens, to pay special subsidies
for speech on the side that [the government] favors.”361 It is important to note that
the Supreme Court in Citizens United did not discuss these cases.
In a recent post-Citizens United case, Knox v. SEIU, the Supreme Court
specifically referenced Citizens United when it stated that even though public-sector
unions have the right under the First Amendment to express their views on political
and social issues, those employees who choose not to join a union have the same
rights.362 These decisions show that the Justices granted First Amendment rights to
some classes of employees, but not to others, which is in direct contravention of the
spirit of the First Amendment and their own rationale used in Citizens United.
F. History of Altering Constitutional Doctrine
The Supreme Court has a history of altering constitutional doctrine when its
understanding of the doctrine’s factual underpinnings no longer appeared to be
356
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accurate. These cases have become some of the most important and powerful
decisions throughout the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. Based upon the empirical
evidence reported in this Article alone, the Supreme Court should have reconsidered
its holding in Citizens United.
In State Board of Education v. Barnette, a group of students who were Jehovah's
Witnesses refused to salute on the ground that the act of saluting the flag was a
forbidden form of worship.363 The Supreme Court found that the state could not
compel students to salute the American flag and recite the pledge of allegiance under
penalty of expulsion because such compulsion exceeded constitutional limitations
and invaded the sphere of intellect and spirit protected by the First Amendment.364
This case overruled Minersville School District v. Gobitis, which held that a
student’s constitutional rights were not violated by the school board's rule that they
participate in a flag-salute ceremony as a condition of their attendance at public
schools even though the students' refusal was based on their religious beliefs.365 In
Barnette, the Supreme Court’s decision was partially based upon the Supreme
Court’s inaccurate overestimation of government power to build national unity in
Gobitis.366
In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court overturned Plessy v.
Ferguson367 and the “separate but equal” doctrine, finding that it had no place in
public education.368 The Court found that the segregation of white and AfricanAmerican children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the AfricanAmerican children.369 The Court went further and stated that “[w]hatever may have
been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this
finding is amply supported by modern authority” and that “[a]ny language in Plessy
v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.”370 In West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, the Supreme Court overruled Adkins v. Children’s Hospital371 and found
that based upon recent economic experience, the denial of a living wage is not only
detrimental to a person’s health and well being but also casts a direct burden for
his/her support upon the community.372
These cases all reflect that the Supreme Court has overruled previous decisions
based upon changed circumstances or when understanding of the doctrine’s factual
underpinnings no longer appeared to be accurate. Even though the Citizens United
decision was only two years ago, the campaign finance landscape has changed
dramatically. A 2010 study conducted by the Sunlight Foundation calculated the
363
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effect of Citizens United on the 2010 midterm election and found that the decision
was responsible for adding $126 million dollars in undisclosed spending by outside
groups and $60 million dollars in disclosed spending by outside groups to the
midterm election.373 According to the FEC, over $200 million dollars has been spent
so far in the 2012 election cycle.374 According to a New York Times study, super
PACs have spent over $113 million dollars in the 2012 election cycle.375 This
empirical data and the empirical data of corruption listed earlier in this Article
reflects that the Supreme Court’s statement that independent expenditures do not
lead to, or create the appearance of, quid pro quo corruption has been found to be
inaccurate and untenable.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has provided ample empirical evidence that there is virtually no
actual difference between independent and coordinated expenditures and that
independent expenditures can and do lead to corruption and the appearance of
corruption. It has presented empirical evidence of individuals creating shell
corporations to conceal the source of political expenditures and also non-profit
corporations being used to conceal the identities of those making political
expenditures.
The Supreme Court had a chance to revisit the Citizens United holding in light of
this evidence, but refused to do so. The Supreme Court should have reexamined its
own holding, especially when there has been a significant change in factual
conditions which renders its previous holding as “detrimental to the public
interest.”376 This Article has certainly demonstrated this circumstance.
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